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Securing Personal Information Assets: 
Testing Antecedents of Behavioral Intentions
Jongki Kim









Due to the increased global reliance on information technology, and the prominence of information resources value, 
identity theft is a problem domain effecting millions of computer users annually. The realities of identity theft are 
highly visible in the global media, although empirical investigations on the topic are limited. The purpose of this 
study is to identify and analyze perceptions of personal information (e.g., identity) as it relates to perceived threats, 
mitigation, perceived risks, and intended safe information practice intentions. We propose a risk analysis model 
based on theoretical variables that have been researched and extensively used in both government and private sector 
organizations. The model is empirically tested using LISREL to perform structural equation modeling. Findings 
indicate support for a relationship between risk and both 1) behavioral intentions to perform safe information 
practices and 2) personal information asset value.
KEYWORDS
Security, Risk, Identity Theft, Behavioral Intentions
INTRODUCTION
Between corporate and personal information (PI) assets, we live in a world of insecurity. It is clear that both 
information systems and the information they contain are vulnerable and risks to these systems and information will 
continue. Risks to information systems and PI have dramatically increased as society becomes more immersed in the 
information age. Both traditional information systems and the newer social oriented systems share more information 
with and about more people than ever before. Each week we see a new and perhaps heretofore unknown story in the 
popular literature regarding threats, risks, and vulnerabilities to information stored or transmitted by hardware, 
software, and network systems created by a variety of vendors – no single system or single vendor is immune to 
threats. 
The information assets go beyond PI that is usually stored and processed by corporate information systems and 
extends to that which is stored by individuals. Identity theft, which has imposed expensive and time consuming 
hardships on its victims, is an ongoing global concern1. In the US, the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 
of 1998 made PI theft with the intent to commit an unlawful act a federal crime. The Act designates the Federal 
Trade Commission to serve as an advocate for victims of identity fraud (Saunders, 1999). 
For PI, the realities of identity theft are strongly visible in popular press and in news media.  Unfortunately, the 
scholarly investigation of this problem domain is limited. The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze how 
individuals assess their PI as an asset along with the associated vulnerabilities and perceived threats and risks. Given 
such an assessment, what intentions do individuals have regarding safeguard controls? This assessment is 
accomplished here by a survey of perceptions and intentions of business students who are presumed to be heavy 
computer users because of their college requirements, and whose identity is easily exposed to those who could or
1 The FTC is active in the identity theft education arena as a search of their web site at 
http://ftc.org yields more than 7,000 “identity theft” matches. They have published information showing 
that the identity theft problem is growing.
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would misuse it. We administered a survey to 176 US college of business students for analysis of risk assessment 
model fit. 
The significance of this study is observable in a large number of recent stories appearing in a wide range of media 
including popular press and TV, academic study, and professional analysts’ research. Studies done by both Gartner 
Research and Harris Interactive (2003) indicated that in the previous 12 months, approximately seven million people 
had been victims of identity theft involving fraud charges averaging more than $90,000 each. Despite these findings, 
Neumann (2008) brings an overall conclusion from a body of literature over the past that “risky problems are as 
great today as they were when we first set out to expose and eradicate them” (p. 80).  He further believes that a huge 
challenge to our community is to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
“It is safe to infer now, more than ever, that individuals are at a high risk of having their personal identifiable 
information compromised and then used by criminals” (Okenyi and Owens, 2007, p. 310). While PI security has 
been the responsibility of information systems managers, the issue should be of major significance to corporate 
managers: "Infosecurity is no longer an ivory tower issue…It is now a key function that is critical in protecting the 
bottom line" (Grant, 2007, p. 48). This impact is shared by Elms, LaPrade and Maurer (2008): “The companies that 
learn how to reduce the frequency and/or severity of the different hacking risks will be rewarded with an increase in 
firm value as compared to their competitors” (p. 4).
This paper examines the perceptions and intentions of future business professionals with an eye toward IP security 
awareness. It contributes to existing knowledge regarding risk analysis, perceptions and intentions by examining an 
established organizational British model (CRAMM) for information security risk analysis as the model parameters 
relate to the individual intention for safe information practices. The practices of individuals remain confusing as they 
are aware of risks to personal information assets through widespread media attention, yet they continue to engage in 
practices that reason dictates are illogical. As an example, this year’s famous 6th annual social engineering 
experiment by Gibbs (2008) revealed that 21% of the 576 people questioned gave away sensitive information for a 
chocolate bar.  It is the findings regarding individual safe practice intentions that contribute to the stream of risk 
analysis study.
Toward that end, the remainder of this paper is organized into four major sections. The first section describes the 
background of Protecting Personal Information (PI) from a corporate and individuals view. The Model 
Development follows and includes the proposed model and hypotheses. The Methodology follows the model and 
hypotheses, and a discussion of the Results of the LISREL tests provides the final section of this research. 
BACKGROUND: PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) collection of citizen complaints, credit card fraud (26%) was the 
most common form of reported identity theft followed by phone or utilities fraud (18%), bank fraud (17%), and 
employment fraud (12%) (FTC, 2005). Other significant categories of identity theft reported by victims were 
government document or benefits fraud (9%) and loan fraud (5%). The average time spent by victims in restoration 
is about 300 hours and this may take years to accomplish. Three forms of identity theft were described. Financial 
identity theft, which involves the imposter’s use of personal identifying information, primarily the Social Security 
number, to establish new credit lines in the name of the victim is the first. Criminal identity theft occurs when a 
criminal gives another person’s personal identifying information in place of his or her own to law enforcement. 
Identity cloning is the third category in which the imposter uses the victim’s information to establish a new life. The 
perpetrator lives and works as the victim. The discussion that follows includes organizational level responsibility for 
the protection of personal information, then individual-level responsibility, and concludes with personal information 
risk management.
Personal Information and Organizational-Level Responsibility
The risk exposure of individuals during Internet shopping extends to the organizations, which are the dominant 
online sellers. A recent study by Wang and Head (2007) found that risk perception plays an important role in e-
commerce trust building which leads to a high level of relationship intention among the participants. But the risks 
certainly extend beyond ecommerce buying and selling. Now even seemingly harmless browsing can lead to 
personal identity compromise. The continuation of phishing and pharming attacks is a testament to the value that PI 
holds for individuals who do not own that information. 
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Organizations have a responsibility to maintain watch over the PI that they maintain for customers, employees, and 
suppliers. Today it is rare to view a corporate website that does not have some written statement regarding care and 
protection of personal identity information. This is in sharp contrast to the situation just over ten years ago when 
Liu, Marchewka, Lu and Yu (2005) reported only 52% of the Fortune 500 contained a privacy policy link from their 
home pages. Today, US citizens have been strongly urged to take precautions against the menace of ID theft. But 
what have we done, should we do, and can we do? Regardless of the answers, we must acknowledge that a part of 
the PI protection responsibility lies with us, but alas, much of the protection of our PI is in the hands of others where 
we have little or no control. Risk management is the key to protection whether via individuals or business. 
Exposed personal computers exist in both homes and businesses. As individuals we recognize the risks associated 
with computer infections and we may fight to protect PI on our PCs with multiple technical safeguards such as 
firewalls, antivirus and anti-spyware software (which also dominate corporate protection controls as determined in 
the 2007 CSI survey). Also as an individual, we might simply want to become better informed about various threats 
and exercise or at least intend to exercise better and safer practices when using online computer access. Presently, 
most organizations do not have the necessary safeguards in place to protect individual identification information. 
Table 1 lists the most serious corporate security breaches of 2006. Still, it is not only organizations that must be held 
accountable. While organizations are losing PI through server attacks, software compromise, and laptop thefts, 
individuals are losing PI from their home computers and mobile devices. 
Organization Event # of Records
Boeing Stolen laptop with employee records 382,000
Aetna








Loss of multiple laptops with employee 
data
60,000
Colorado Dept of 
Human Services





Breach of database with patient data
253,900
General Electric Stolen laptop with employee records 50,000
Circuit City
Chase credit services misplaced tape 




Stolen laptop with driver’s license 
holder information
132,400
Kaiser Stolen laptop with customer data 160,000
Table 1: Significant Data Breaches of 2006 (source: Hines, 2007)
Personal Information and Individual-Level Responsibility
Internet shopping has been considered high-risk individual-level behavior for the past decade. A Forrester Research 
study reported that almost two-thirds of respondents reported not buying products online due to concerns about the 
security of their PI (Portz, Strong, Busta, and Schneider, 2000), and some argue that the concerns are worsening as 
the public becomes more aware of the information risks involved in Internet shopping (Perez, 2005). For an 
individual, the risk associated with PI loss depends on the value the individual places on the types of information. 
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Social security numbers (SSN) have more value than other types of PI. The SSN has been labeled as the ‘Holy 
Grail’ of information (Berghel, 2000) because with it, data aggregation is easily accomplished and all other PI 
becomes more readily available. This asset should have enormous value to its true owner and more than small value 
to those non-owners who would steal and misuse it. Berghel (2007) points out the historical usage creep of the SSN 
as a personal identifier and the dangers surrounding that use. Once, as Berghel put it, “the toothpaste was out of the 
tube” and the use of the SSN had spread beyond its intended use for the Social Security Administration, it quickly 
became a unique personal identifier, not only for the government, but also for educational institutions and 
organizations outside of the government. There are currently multiple efforts to contain the spread of the SSN, but 
these efforts have proven to be too little and too late. 
Given that the online threats are increasing and ever-changing, one can question how individuals are trying to 
protect their PI. After an evaluation of perceived threats, risks, and asset value, computer users theoretically have a 
range of potential response behaviors. Perhaps the most influential theory that is used for intentions is Ajzen’s 
(1991) Theory of Planned Behavior. This theory describes behavioral intentions and behavior as a product of 
attitudes toward the behavior, perceived subjective norm, and perceptions of the problems related to the behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991).  For online users, the attitude captures an overall evaluation of engaging in risk prevention strategies. 
This can be measured by perceived usefulness and value. The subjective norm refers to a person’s perception of how 
important others perceive the behavior.  The perceived behavioral control refers to the user’s controllability over 
resources and protection of private information as well as the skills of conducting the behavior (Pavlou and 
Fygenson, 2006).      
The individual-level responsibility to protect PI is a motivator of this study. We wish to illuminate the relationship 
between the perceived PI threats and risks of individual users and their mitigation responses. The possible response 
behaviors by individuals, who have fewer resources to devote to controls, also extend to the responsibilities of 
organizations to protect PI.
Personal Information Risk Management
The intent of risk management is to quantify the impact of exercised threats. Identification of risks and the costs 
involved in their mitigation surround the risk management process. Risk management can be, and often is, 
accompanied by financial justifications. An authoritative CSI survey indicates that 77% of organizations responding 
to the 12th CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey acknowledge conducting some form of economic evaluation of 
their security expenditures using quantitative measures of ROI (39%), IRR (21%) or NPV (17%) (Richardson, 
2007). The study suggests that despite the criticality of protection, managers believe that justification of security 
expenditures is needed for senior management approval. The significance of using capital budgeting techniques for 
evaluating information security assets often depends on the “support of senior level management” (Okenyi and 
Owens, 2007, p. 307).
If cost justification, as noted by CSI (2007) and Okenyi and Owens (2007), is extended to the individual level of 
analysis, each person who perceives threats to PI (assets) must make a judgment as to the worth of each mitigation 
strategy. That is, one might ask, is it worth $29.95 each year to reduce the risks of spyware to my home computer? 
In this sense, the individual is performing a cost-benefit analysis regarding risk management. The point of this 
discussion is that the individual, much like the corporation, uses risk analysis in his or her risk management 
practices. Kosba (2008) also drives this point as he states: “current privacy theory regards people’s privacy related 
behavior as the result of a situation-specific cost-benefit analysis, in which the potential risk of disclosing one’s 
personal information are weighed against potential benefits of disclosure”(p. 25). The extent of use of a specific 
mitigation strategy is a function of individual perceptions of asset value, threats, and mitigation response costs. But, 
mitigation strategies may well differ when dealing with digitized personal information.
How individuals take and respond to risks comes from different biological, psychological, and social causes. Yet 
there is confusion in the different ways that individuals deal with personal risks and personal information risks 
related to computers. In the former case people often think through risks and deliberately assume them. In contrast, 
when dealing with computers, people seem to take risks “unconsciously and in some cases unwillingly.” (Zegans, 
2008, p. 152.) This supports arguing for additional education and training to increase awareness.
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MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Vulnerabilities and threats to an individual’s PI asset change over time. Therefore, individuals cannot make a single 
decision with regard to safe information practices. Rather, users continually evaluate the components of asset value, 
mitigation strategies, threats and risks to form intentions as to courses of action. “Risk mitigation involves the 
process of prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing appropriate controls” (Dhillon, 2007, p. 166). Three essential 
components of risk management are risk assessment, risk mitigation, and risk evaluation. Risk assessment includes 
the identification and evaluation of risks so as to assess the potential impact and results in safeguard controls. In 
order to determine the likelihood of future adverse events the “threats, vulnerabilities and controls must be evaluated 
together” (Dhillon, 2007, p. 158). The interplay between the three dictates the impact that an adverse event might 
have. Similarly the government’s NIST 800-30 (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf) risk 
determination helps assess the level of risks. The level of risk is a function of the likelihood of a threat exploiting 
vulnerability, the magnitude of the impact of the threat, and the adequacy of existing or planned controls. These 
relationships are also implemented in the British government’s CCTA Risk Analysis and Method Management 
(CRAMM) (Siemens, 2007) model, and Yim’s (2002) risk assessment model. 
Proposed Model
ASSET, THREAT, MITIGATION STRATEGY, RISK, and BEHAVIORAL INTENTION are the building blocks 
of the research model shown as Figure 1. It extends risk analysis baseline theory of CRAMM by including user 
intention to secure assets as the dependent variable in the management of PI risk.
Figure 1: A Personal Identity Risk Research Model
The model identifies the interplay suggested by Dhillon (2007) and noted in NIST 800-30, Yim (2002), and the 
British CRAMM models. For the present study, each of the model components may be explained as they apply to 
individual PI. The ASSET is the PI of the individual. As noted earlier, individuals place different values on their PI 
and further some components of PI, such as SSN, may be ascribed more value than others such as cellular telephone 
number. The THREATS to PI are exemplified by hackers, virus code, phishing attacks, etc. MITIGATION is the 
exercise of and extent of control being used to safeguard against the threat. This interplay provides for the RISK as 
shown in the CRAMM study model. The final component of the model is INTENTIONS. These are measured by 
variables that ask what the user plans to do with regard to technical features and safe practices.
It is our contention, as in the models that have been briefly reviewed, that PI risks like organizational risks are 
dependent on asset values (called systems characteristics in 800-30), threats, and vulnerabilities. Risk is often a 
surrogate measure of how much security we do or do not have. It is operationalized here as the probability that a 
threat will exploit a weakness of a system. A threat is any environmental contingency or event with the potential to 
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risk management methods. Although the interest in this research is toward individuals, a corporate perspective as 
relayed in the models is appropriate as individual risks may come from carelessness of an organization or individual. 
Regardless of source, damage to PI is at least one result.  
Hypothesis Development
The preceding discussion has indicated a tie between organizations and individuals with regard to risk analysis, 
especially when this analysis uses PI as the asset of concern. This discussion leads us to propose four hypotheses for 
the preliminary model suggested in Figure 1. 
It is widely accepted that IS managers assign higher risk levels based on how they prioritize the assets they protect. 
As explained by Ortega (2007), the link between asset and risk valuation is caused by the tendency of attackers to 
target higher-valued information assets: “High-value corporate assets are becoming more marketable on black 
markets, making cybercrime extremely profitable. The asset-risk valuation association is well articulated by 
Macaulay (2006), who describes assets as having varying degrees of “risk conducting” (p. 13) properties. As noted, 
risk management includes asset identification and evaluation. For these reasons, we hypothesize that as the asset 
value increases, so does perception of risk:
Hypothesis 1: As the asset value increases, so does perception of risk.
As individuals perceive greater threats to their information assets, they should perceive greater risks to PI. As 
incidents of attacks continue to rise, so will the need for risk management (Thomas, 2004). This logic is used in 
Yim’s (2002) risk model. Because perceptions of threats influence perceived risk, economic changes occur in the 
field of information security (Grant, 2007, p. 48). Neglecting risks while threats increase has been documented as a 
major cause of security breach: “The underlying problem is that many managers are not well versed on the nature of 
systems risk, likely leading to inadequately protected systems” (Straub and Welke, 1998, p. 442). Therefore, we 
hypothesize a relationship between perceived threats and perceived risks: 
Hypothesis 2: As the perceived threat increases, so does the perception of risk.
Perceived risk is also influenced by mitigation strategies employed to combat security breaches. This relationship is 
expected for at least two reasons. First, the malware landscape changes rapidly and the attackers always seem to be 
one step ahead of the defenders. Mitigation strategies may lead to risk because “risks are increasing faster than the 
amelioration of those risks" (Neumann, 2003, p. 136). In high reliability situations, small errors can lead to severe 
outcomes and consequences so that risk mitigation is critical to survival on the organization (Grabowski & Roberts, 
1998). Similarly, important elements of PI such as a SSN or credit card number need not be compromised multiple 
times as one compromise can lead to extensive damage. Further, multiple risk exposure is not required for 
compromise as one exposure can result in severe loss. In these situations mitigation is critical for the reduction of 
risks. An alternate view is that mitigation strategies work against the goal of risk reduction because they may cause 
an over-reliance on systems and an under-reliance on people. Thus, people could rely heavily on formal 
countermeasures and become less aware of threats and risks. We take the first, more conventional, and more logical 
view regarding risks associated with personal information. 
Hypothesis 3: As mitigation strategies increase, perceived risk is reduced
As users perceive the risk of security breaches to increase, they are likely to change their behavioral intentions 
pertaining to security defense. The theory of reasoned action (TRA) suggests that perceived risk or anxiety 
influences behavioral intentions (Liu et al, 1997), an important motivator of actual behavior (Venkatesh, Morris, 
Davis, and Davis, 2003). Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior suggests that intentions are related to attitude 
and to a perception of problems. For online users, the attitude captures an overall evaluation of encountering risks. 
For these reasons, we hypothesize a relationship between perceived risk and the behavioral intentions to reduce 
risks:
Hypothesis 4: As perceived risk increases, so does behavioral intention to reduce risks
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METHODOLOGY
This study involves creation of a model to be used for individual risk analysis related to the protection of the 
personal information asset or personal identity information. This protection is essential in today’s world where 
compromises of PI have become an epidemic. To test the model a survey was administered and the survey data was 
used to test the four hypotheses developed in support of the research model. 
Survey
The survey instrument shown in Appendix A is based on several established standards. In part the questions mirror 
some of the questions used to examine perceptions of computer viruses in the mid 1990’s (Jones, et al.) The study 
found that college students, at that time had reasonably strong knowledge concerning the threats of computer 
viruses, which had been infecting computers for several years when the questionnaire was administered. Later this 
survey was expanded to capture knowledge concerning spyware (Schmidt & Arnett, 2005). Also included are 
questions from a study of security concerns in Ecommerce by Chen, Schmidt, Phan, and Arnett (2008).
Sample
From the survey administration in the college of business, 176 questionnaires were collected. Among them, 19 were 
excluded due to missing values. Therefore, 157 responses were used in the data analysis. The sample is dominated 
by male respondents (66.1%) which is not typical of the university or college enrollment, but likely mirrors the fact 
that the respondents for this study were enrolled in an MIS or information security course. This heavy male 
enrollment is typical of MIS enrollments at this institution. The respondents in total are young with 96% of them 
being under 30 years of age and, as expected, all of them have at least some college education. Moreover, more than 
one-half of these respondents report that they spend eleven or more hours per week using the Internet. The large 
categorical percentages indicate need for change to the initial instrument before expansion of this study to other 
subjects and countries.
RESULTS
Data analysis was conducted with the two-step approach suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). LISREL 8.51 
was used in the analysis. The first step was to conduct instrument validation beginning with unidimensionality 
analysis (Garver and Mentzer, 1999). As suggested by Gefen, Karahanna, and Straub (2003) items which had a high 
degree of residual variance with other items were deleted one by one. This process resulted in deleting several items 
such as TH4, RM1, RSK1, RSK5, RSK6, and INT4. The correlation matrix is available as Appendix 2.
Composite construct reliability (CCR) and average variance extracted (AVE) are commonly used to assess construct 
reliability. Fornell and Lacrker (1981) suggested a threshold value of 0.7 for CCR and 0.5 for AVE. All coefficients 
exceeded those values as shown in Table 2 below. Therefore construct reliability is evident.
Construct validity is usually assessed in terms of two aspects; convergent validity and discriminant validity (Gefen, 
2003). Commonly used criteria for convergent validity are for a standardized loading of greater than 0.5 and a t-
value that is greater than 2.0 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988).  All indicators were larger than 0.5 and each indicator 
significantly loaded on the corresponding construct and construct validity is verified. 
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Construct Item Loading t-value S.E. CCR AVE
AS1 .93 15.40 .13 .951 .762
AS2 .89 14.05 .22 
AS3 .89 14.20 .21 
AS4 .92 14.93 .16 
Asset
AS5 .83 12.64 .31 
TH1 .80 11.58 .37 .884 .656
 TH2 .84 12.50 .30 
TH3 .84 12.66 .29 
Threat
TH5 .76 1.87 .42 
RM2 .62 8.46 .61 .894 .683
RM3 .80 11.79 .37 
RM4 .93 15.02 .14 
Mitigation 
RM5 .92 14.79 .15 
RSK2 .88 13.90 .22 .936 .830
RSK3 .93 15.00 .14 Risk
RSK4 .92 14.93 .15 
INT1 .84 12.64 .29 .900 .636
INT2 .88 13.63 .22 
INT3 .82 12.13 .33 
Intention
INT5 .78 11.38 .39 
Table 2: Item Loadings and Construct Reliabilities
Discriminant validity is the extent to which an item measures a uniquely defined latent construct (Gefen, 2003). 
There are several methods to examine discriminant validity. This study employed a method suggested by Fornell 
and Lacrker (1981) in which the square root of AVE of a construct is compared with the corresponding correlation 
coefficients. If the square root value is greater than any of corresponding row and column of correlation coefficients, 
then construct validity is held. As shown in Table 3 below, constructs in this study satisfied the above criteria.
AVE ASSET THREAT MITGATION RISK INTENTION
ASSET .762 .873*
THREAT .656 .727 .810
MITIGATION .683 .508 .568 .826
RISK .830 .580 .508 .412 .911
INTENTION .636 .678 .599 .522 .464 .797
*diagonals are square root of AVE
Table 3: Discriminant Validity
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Table 4 below shows the overall model fit statistics for the research model. Some of the indices are less than 
satisfactory. This is due to the insignificant relationships shown in the research model from Figure 1. Among the 
four paths of the model, only those from ‘Asset’ to ‘Risk’ and from ‘Risk’ to ‘Intention’ are significant at the .01 
level. Thus while some of the hypotheses can be validated, the model as a whole does not fit. This absence of fit is 




















*desired levels are from Teo et al. (2003)
Table 4: Overall Model Fit
The model and its significance are shown as Figure 2. Although via CRAMM three factors were supposed to 
influence the level of risk perceived by users, only the ‘Asset’ factor proved to be significant. The significant 
relationship between ‘Asset’ and ‘Risk’ implies that as the value of the asset (any PI needing protection from 
identity theft) increases, individuals assume a heightened risk perception associated with stolen identity. On the 
other hand, users do not perceive (or perhaps understand) that risks are threats that can be exercised, and that 
mitigation controls may aid in risk reduction, but not completely eliminate risks.
CONCLUSIONS
In terms of paths in the proposed model, two were significant at the 0.01 level: asset value to risk, and risk to 
intention. These are positive points, but not necessarily intuitive. Increased personal asset value, whether monetary 
or perceived, will result in greater perceived risks to the individual owner of the asset. More importantly, as the risk 
increases, then individuals will intend to better protect their information assets. Two other paths of the experimental 
model were not significant. While the model fit can be described as marginally successful, the lack of fit between 
mitigation and risk leaves questions. The central one is whether or not mitigation really does influence risk 
perception in either direction.  
A possible explanation for the absence of fit between mitigation strategies and risk is that users do not foresee that 
current mitigation strategies will continue to eliminate risk. This finding has an important implication for security 
managers, who presumably expect safeguard controls to reduce risk – this expectation may never be met. This 
finding shows that mitigation does not equate to the elimination of risks. Such false expectations for mitigation 
strategies have generated insignificant relationships between these two constructs in our setting. For example, if I 
assume that once installed, and anti-spyware application will protect me against all spyware, then I will be 
disappointed. If I do not continue the mitigation strategy and continually update the software, then new spyware, 
which was unavailable at the time of the original installation of the software, will become a risk. This is particular 
true in the malware battleground where even the best known anti-virus companies are foiled by hackers, and these 
companies too have been the targets of successful attacks.
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As for the absence of fit in the model between threat and risk, the close association between the two may be another 
source of confusion in the perceptions of the respondents. For example, a threat can be defined as “a circumstance or 
event with the potential to cause harm” (Krutz and Vines, p. 936) and a risk as “the likelihood that a threat will 
occur” (Krutz and Vines, p. 929), then this causal relationship may be perceived as being the same by a non-security 
conscious expert. It is possible that, even though the connection is theoretical, the difference in organizational 
commitment and individual commitment to manage risks is dissimilar because legislation may dictate corporate 
policy and practice. Individuals have no such external motivations.
Our results indicate that individual perceptions of risks and the intentions for security mitigation depend on three 
factors: 1) the value that the individual places on his PI assets, 2) the severity of the threats against that asset, and 3) 
the extent of mitigation practices in place. For instance, fear appeals (LaRose et al, 2005) such as those frequently 
shown on TV regarding identity theft, will result in different responses for different users. These responses are a 
function of how much the person who views the appeals believes him or herself to be vulnerable to the threat, and 
the extent of damage that an exercised threat would generate. For corporate America, the responses to threats may 
be dictated with legislation. For example, the Personal Data Privacy & Security Act of 2007 which was initially 
presented to the Senate as follows: 
“To prevent and mitigate identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, to 
enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections against security breaches, 
fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information.”
This kind of legislation should reduce the list of threats noted in Table 1 so that risk can be mitigated. Furthermore, 
an ‘awareness prescription’ has been proposed in recent published work by Okenyi and Owens (2007): “The best 
control against this attack is education by training people to be aware of the value of the information assets at their 
disposal as well create awareness of human hacking techniques, which makes it easy for them to diagnose a social 
engineer” (p. 306). Further, before PI risk management can be successful, management needs to understand the 
significance of ongoing awareness: “In order to secure the support of senior level management, it is necessary to 
help them understand that security awareness is a vital element in protecting the organization information assets” 
(Okenyi and Owens, 2007, p. 307).The present study has several limitations. We have not attempted to measure 
understanding, and have rather stood by testing a specific model’s parameters. It is likely that knowing a risk and 
understanding a risk would produce different responses, especially in terms of mitigation strategies. This study used 
all levels of undergraduate students as subjects. While students have well known limitations as subjects, this is not 
believed to be a serious concern in this study because these students should be as aware of information theft as the 
normal population. More importantly, these students were enrolled in an MIS course, and as such they may be more 
aware of information security concerns because of the subject matter. In that regard there may be a limitation of 
students who do not mirror the general population of students as these could be using mitigation strategies as a part 
of class assignments. Of lesser concern are the geographic limits of the study as it was confined to one university in 
the US. But information theft, while presently a larger threat in the US, is expected to grow rapidly once ecommerce 
payment systems and similar mechanisms that expose digital secrets become more popular. The questions answered 
in this study must be answered in larger context both in the US and in other countries as well and they need to be 
answered with a more diverse group of students. 
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Figure 2: A Test of the Personal Identity Risk Research Model
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Appendix A – Questionnaire  I tem Mapping
Measure Question
AS1 My personal information (e.g. SSN) is valuable to me.
AS2 My user information (address, telephone number, etc.) is important.
AS3 Log-in credentials, such as a password, are important to me.
AS4 Financial information (e.g. credit card number and expiration date) entered for 
Internet commerce is important to me.
AS5 Personal information that I submit to Internet sites is highly valued to me.
TH1 Malicious code or malware (Viruses, Trojan Horses, Rootkits, Phishing, 
Pharming, Spyware, etc.) are detrimental to my personal information.   
TH2 A hacker could be a menace to my personal information. 
TH3 I am concerned about accidental disclosure of my personal information.
TH4 I am concerned about intentional disclosure of my personal information.
TH5 When others spoof (impersonate someone else) my personal information is 
threatened.
RM1 Weak passwords can allow my identity to be stolen.
RM2 A wireless Internet connection is susceptible to eavesdropping.
RM3 Unencrypted email can allow my identity to be stolen.
RM4 Failing to update my operating system patches can allow my identity to be stolen.
RM5 Failing to update my browser patches can allow my identity to be stolen.
RSK1 If my identity is stolen I could experience financial loss.  
RSK2 Identity theft would decrease my trust in information systems. 
RSK3 Identity theft would decrease trust in my operating system. 
RSK4 Identity theft would decrease trust in my current browser.
RSK5 If my identity were stolen, it would negatively affect my credit rating. 
RSK6 If my identity were stolen it would take a lot of time to fix the problem.
INT1 I plan to reduce identity theft by using strong passwords.
INT2 I will attempt to lessen the probability of ID theft by using anti-spyware software.
INT3 I will attempt to prevent ID theft by installing security patches on my operating 
system.
INT4 I will attempt to prevent ID theft by installing security patches on my Internet 
Browser.
INT5 I intend to decrease identity theft by not responding to suspicious email.
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Appendix B – Correlation Matrix
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 TH1 TH2 TH3 TH4 TH5 RM1 RM2 RM3 RM4 RM5 RSK1 RSK2 RSK3 RSK4 RSK5 RSK6 INT1 INT2 INT3 INT4 INT5
AS1 1
AS2 0.84 1
AS3 0.83 0.83 1
AS4 0.85 0.76 0.87 1
AS5 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.77 1
TH1 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.66 1
TH2 0.54 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.67 0.70 1
TH3 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.52 0.63 0.68 0.67 1
TH4 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.60 0.58 0.82 1
TH5 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.48 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.67 1
RM1 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.51 0.54 0.44 0.61 0.59 0.52 1
RM2 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.32 0.46 0.48 0.39 0.60 1
RM3 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.62 1
RM4 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.42 0.36 0.35 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.57 0.76 1
RM5 0.50 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.36 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.63 0.71 0.88 1
RSK1 0.70 0.59 0.68 0.73 0.62 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.40 0.42 0.60 0.42 0.41 0.35 0.43 1
RSK2 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.36 0.43 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.32 0.40 0.30 0.29 0.54 1
RSK3 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.48 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.72 1
RSK4 0.45 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.36 0.45 0.36 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.77 0.85 1
RSK5 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.62 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.42 0.61 0.41 0.46 0.46 1
RSK6 0.66 0.61 0.63 0.69 0.59 0.48 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.49 0.39 0.33 0.31 0.42 0.66 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.80 1
INT1 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.52 0.42 0.32 0.48 0.40 0.36 0.65 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.50 0.49 1
INT2 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.42 0.44 0.51 0.41 0.43 0.50 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.50 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.70 1
INT3 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.46 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.52 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.36 0.60 0.75 1
INT4 0.23 0.24 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.03 0.28 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.30 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.37 0.20 0.30 1
INT5 0.69 0.61 0.66 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.48 0.37 0.29 0.30 0.40 0.57 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.51 0.57 0.66 0.63 0.57 0.33 1
